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 Abstract 
The article examines the impact of geographical proximity to the West and Western aid 
on democracy in Russia’s regions and advances a geographic-incrementalist theory of 
democratization. Even when national politicians exhibit authoritarian tendencies, 
diffusion processes and targeted foreign aid help advance democratization at the sub-
national level in post-communist states and other settings.  We make this case by 
conducting process-tracing case studies of democratic institution-building in two 
Northwestern border regions, as well as statistical analysis of over one thousand projects 
that the European Union carried out in Russia’s localities over fourteen years.  We find 
that the EU shows commitment to democratic reform particularly in, but not limited to, 
regions located on its Eastern frontier.  This over time positively affects the democratic 
trajectory of the respective regions even if they had been more closed to begin with 
compared to other regions.  
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A Geographic Incrementalist Theory of Democratization: 
Territory, EU Aid, and Democracy in  
Post-Communist Regions* 
 
Introduction 
  
The accession to the European Union (EU) of Central Europe’s post-communist 
states has been regarded a success story. Within a short period of time, EU membership 
prospects have induced these countries to institutionalize democratic practices. The 
“Rose” and “Orange” Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine have inspired hopes that these 
states will one day too join the prestigious club of Western nations.  
 One apparent pattern of these developments is the advancement of 
democratization from the West eastwards.1 Yet, if this is the case, what explains the 
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puzzle of the stubborn refusal of some post-communist states to embrace democracy? 
Belarus has unshakably remained “Europe’s last dictatorship”; in Moldova, democracy 
has been on the decline, and recently, Freedom House has downgraded Russia to “not 
free” status.2 Among Western donors disillusionment abounds: they now stress the limits, 
more than the power, of external “norm entrepreneurship” efforts.3 Certain nations, 
scholars now argue, are simply too “impervious to outside influences”4; they feel 
“surrounded by foes” and nurture an unwavering “hostility towards the West.”5 Are some 
post-communist states all that “impervious” or are we missing something in our analysis, 
which prevents us from accurately observing and predicting change?  
 We argue that a “center-centered”6 perspective obscures our understanding of 
what we call geographic incremental processes of democratization at sub-national levels. 
Even when national politicians exhibit authoritarian tendencies, territorially conditioned 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly, “Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the 
Postcommunist World,” World Politics 53 (October 2000). 
2 Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 2004, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=17&year=2004 (accessed September 20, 2006). 
3 Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn, eds., The Power and Limits of NGOs: A Critical Look at Building 
Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 
4 Kopstein and Reilly (fn. 1).  
5 Richard Pipes, “Flight from Freedom: What Russians Think and Want,” Foreign Affairs 83 (May/June 
2004), 13, 15. 
6 Richard Snyder, “Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative Method,” Studies in Comparative 
International Development 36 (Spring 2001). 
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diffusion processes from the West and targeted democratization efforts of Western 
neighbors help build up support for democracy among local actors.7  
We advance this argument by conducting process-tracing case studies of Western 
involvement in Russia’s regions, and statistical analysis of openness and democracy 
levels as they relate to geographical location and Western aid.  Our case studies are based 
on field research conducted over a period of two years in several sub-national regions, as 
well as in-depth interviews with regional actors and EU officials in Moscow and 
Brussels. For our statistical analysis we use an original data set that we composed of all, 
more than one thousand, EU projects conducted in Russia’s regions over fourteen years. 
In the following section, we discuss approaches to external influences on 
democracy and propose an alternative theory. We then outline a framework for 
investigating Western impact on Russia’s regions. In the third part, we examine patterns 
of EU aid allocation.  In the fourth part, we conduct statistical analysis of relationships 
among proximity to the West, EU aid, and regional outcomes. In the fifth part, we deepen 
the exploration of the relevant causal mechanisms by conducting process-tracing case 
studies of two Northwestern regions, Pskov and Karelia. We conclude with a discussion 
of broader implications for theory building and for understanding patterns of 
democratization. 
 
 
                                                 
7 On external-domestic actor interactions, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Introduction,” in Bringing 
Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic 
Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988). 
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Theorizing External Influences on Democracy 
 
One of the most highly contested conclusions of Giullermo O’Donnell, Philippe 
Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead’s study of transitions from authoritarian rule in Latin 
America and Southern Europe was the negligible role of external factors. It would be 
“fruitless,” they argued, “to search for some international factor or context which can 
reliably compel authoritarian rulers to experiment with liberalization.”8 We now know 
that the assertion does not withstand scrutiny when applied to other contexts.9 The 
constructivist shift in international relations scholarship has made it even more difficult to 
overlook the significance of transnational factors, such as ideas and norms serving as 
“soft” incentives to democratic change and going beyond the narrow group of domestic 
elite actors.10 Transitologists have since qualified their assumptions regarding the role of 
international and regional factors as applied to other settings.11 
                                                 
8 Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, “Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies,” in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars 
and Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 18. 
9 See for example Archie Brown, “Transnational Influences in the Transition from Communism,” Post-
Soviet Affairs 16 (April 2000); Laurence Whitehead, ed., The International Dimensions of 
Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Giuseppe di Palma, 
“Legitimation from the Top to Civil Society: Politico-Cultural Change in Eastern Europe,” World Politics 
44 (October 1991); Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, “Contentious Politics in New Democracies: East 
Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 1989-93,” World Politics 50 (July 1998), 550. 
10 Joseph Nye, Jr., “The Decline of America’s Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry,” Foreign 
Affairs 83 (May 2004); Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor, eds., Global Civil Society 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, 
Human Rights and the Demise of Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Margaret E. 
Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., The 
Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999); Andrew Moravcsik, “The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in 
Postwar Europe,” International Organization 54 (Spring 2000).  
11 For transitology debates, see Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “The Conceptual Travels of 
Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should they Attempt to Go?,” Slavic Review 53 
(Spring 1994); Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain: 
Grounding Transitologists or Students of Postcommunism?,” Slavic Review 54 (Winter 1995); Stephen F. 
Cohen, “Russian Studies Without Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 15 (January 1999); Brown (fn. 9); Valerie 
Bunce, “Comparative Democratization: Big and Grounded Generalizations,” Comparative Political Studies 
33 (August 2000); Valerie Bunce, “Lessons of the First Postsocialist Decade,” East European Politics and 
Societies 13 (Spring 1999); Valerie Bunce, “The Political Economy of Postsocialism,” Slavic Review 58 
(Winter 1999); Valerie Bunce, “Regional Differences in Democratization: The East Versus the South,” 
Post-Soviet Affairs 14 (July 1998); Valerie Bunce, “Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the 
Postcommunist Experience,” World Politics 55 (January 2003); Doh Chull Chin, “On The Third Wave of 
Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research,” World Politics 47 (October 
1994); Valerie Bunce, “Should Transitologists be Grounded?,” Slavic Review 54 (Spring 1995); Howard J. 
Wiarda, “Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and Comparative Politics: ‘Transitology’ and the Need for 
New Theory,” East European Politics and Societies 15 (Fall 2001); Larry Diamond and Mark F. Plattner, 
eds., Democracy after Communism (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Charles King, 
“Post-Communism: Transition, Comparison, and the End of ‘Eastern Europe’,” World Politics 53 (October 
2000); Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13 (January 
2002); Jordan Gans-Morse, “Searching for Transitologists: Contemporary Theories of Post-Communist 
Transitions and the Myth of a Dominant Paradigm,” Post-Soviet Affairs 20 (October/December 2004). 
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Much of the theorizing on democratization shares two important shortcomings 
with the original transitology framework, however. These are the absence of territorially 
conditioned external factors as key variables; and the essentially de-territorialised, 
“whole nation”-biased12 view of democratic change.  
Lawrence Whitehead has for example proposed a typology that hints at the 
significance of territory. One element in his typology of external influences is “contagion 
through proximity,” which would explain the temporal sequencing of clusters of 
democratization in particular geographic locations.13 Philippe Schmitter adds an 
additional dimension to Whitehead’s typology, namely conditionality, which has been a 
motor for democratic consolidation in post-communist EU accession states, all regionally 
clustered and adjacent to West European democracies.14 
 Despite references to geography in such elements of the typology as contagion 
and conditionality, however, not only is geography not explicitly theorized, but 
statements about its relevance are highly qualified. Whitehead, for example, does not 
specify how exactly contagion operates, indicating that it is an agenda for future research. 
“We are searching, . . . for neutral transmission mechanisms that might induce countries 
bordering on democracies to replicate the political institutions of their neighbors,” he 
writes. Whitehead even downplays the role of territory in the context of the growing role 
of mass communications. He states that “images of the good life in North America or 
                                                 
12 Snyder (fn. 6). 
13 The other elements in his typology being “control” and “consent.” Laurence Whitehead, “Three 
International Dimensions of Democratization,” in Whitehead (fn. 9), 15. 
14 Philippe C. Schmitter, “The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National 
Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies,” in Whitehead (fn. 9). 
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Western Europe may produce equally powerful effects in the Southern Cone as in the 
Caribbean, in Siberia as in the Baltic States.”15 Philippe Schmitter likewise cautions 
against “exaggerate[ing] either the reach of . . . communicative interdependence or its 
impact upon democratization.”16 “Modern systems of communication are not so spatially 
bound,” he writes.17 Like Whitehead, Schmitter stops short of identifying precise ways in 
which territorial contexts might be important for communication and diffusion. He states 
that “the international context is a notoriously difficult variable to pin down . . . its causal 
impact is often indirect, working in mysterious and unintended ways.”18  
In their masterful volume on democratic transitions Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan 
likewise identify the importance of transnational diffusion effects. Their concept of the 
“international political community,” however, with its stress on the global reach of mass 
communications likewise shifts focus away from territorial aspects of diffusion. They do 
admit that a “regional hegemon” such as the European Community (sic) may play a 
“major supportive . . . role in helping a fledgling democracy in the region,” but they 
qualify its role as not “determinative.”19  
Geographically uneven patterns of democratic outcomes are becoming 
increasingly difficult to ignore, however. Adam Przeworski has been strongly criticized 
                                                 
15 Whitehead (fn. 13), 21. 
16 Schmitter (fn. 14), 35. 
17 Ibid., 38. 
18 Ibid., 28. 
19 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996), 74. 
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for suggesting earlier that geography no longer matters.20 According to him, “geography, 
with whatever it implies, is just not enough to shape economic and political futures.”21 A 
recent study by Przeworski and his collaborators serves as a significant corrective to this 
premise. They find that “the larger the proportion of democracies on the globe and in the 
region during a particular year, the more likely is democracy to survive in any particular 
country.” They too, however, highlight the methodological complications involved in 
“statistically distinguish[ing] different mechanisms by which the international climate 
becomes transmitted to particular countries.”22 
Within the post-communist region in particular there is a growing recognition of 
geographical clustering of democratic winners and losers.23 The peculiarity of these 
constellations is thus summarized in M. Steven Fish’s comparative study of post-
communist regimes: “The West seems to prevail over the East.”24 Valerie Bunce likewise 
notes the importance of “geography”25 and the “striking intraregional contrast in post-
                                                 
20 Wiarda (fn. 11), 487. 
21 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 191. 
With respect to Eastern Europe, though, he writes that geography is the main reason why it should succeed 
in joining the West. Ibid., 190. 
22 Adam Przeworski, Michael A. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, “What Makes 
Democracies Endure?,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Divergence of 
Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 171. 
23 For theories of post-communist democracy, see Richard Anderson, Postcommunism and the Theory of 
Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).  
24 M. Steven Fish, “Post-Communist Subversion: Social Science and Democratization in East Europe and 
Eurasia,” Slavic Review 58 (Winter 1999), 794. 
25 Bunce (fn. 11, 2003). 
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socialist economic and political pathways,” with Central and East European countries in 
the West better performers than the former USSR states in the east.26 While largely 
focusing on domestic factors in accounting for post-communist regime variations, 
Michael McFaul also concedes: “neighborhoods” and proximity to the West “matter.”27  
Nevertheless, we have yet to take the next step in establishing precisely how 
regional contexts matter, empirically and theoretically, and the literature on the topic 
remains scarce. For example, with respect to geography, both Bunce and McFaul in their 
recent articles include reference to one single study—that by Jeffrey Kopstein and David 
Reilly, which we later discuss in detail.28 This fact illustrates not omission of important 
sources on the part of the two scholars, but the paucity of the literature that actually exists 
on the subject. 
M. Steven Fish identifies a major factor complicating analysis of the impact of 
geographical contexts. He argues that although “geographical location may well affect 
the cross-national variation in trajectories of democratization,”29 our “empirical 
foundations of such prima facie conclusions” remain “shaky.”30 Pointing to the overlap 
                                                 
26 Bunce (fn. 11, 1999), 759, 767. 
27 Michael McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the 
Postcommunist World,” World Politics 54 (January 2002), 242. On East-West variations in civil society 
development, see Ian Kubik, “How to Study Civil Society: The State of the Art and What to do Next,” East 
European Politics and Societies 19 (Winter 2005), 100. 
28 Kopstein and Reilly (fn. 1). 
29 M. Steven Fish, “Democratization’s Requisites: The Postcommunist Experience,” Post-Soviet Affairs 14 
(July 1998), 233, 228. 
30 Fish (fn. 24), 794. 
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of geography with other factors, such as history, religion, and imperial tutelage, he 
argued in a footnote: “It is impossible [emphasis added] to separate out the possible 
weight of these factors.” 31  
 This argument is valid. But what if levels of democracy are territorially uneven 
within the same national context, where variations in patterns of historical incorporation 
and imperial tutelage are not as substantial as between countries formerly part of distinct 
empires?  In this case it would be possible not only to separate the impact of geography 
from other factors, but also to account for external diffusion influences on 
democratization in a way that would not be feasible by looking at the national level.  
This brings us to the second shortcoming in the literature on democratization. The 
underestimation of territorial aspects of democratic change has not only been evident in 
how we look at external influences, but also in the lack of emphasis on the role of sub-
national actors.32 To the extent that sub-national territory has been inferred in the 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 797. On assessing the impact of external factors, see also George W. Breslauer, “The Impact of the 
International Environment: Theoretical and Methodological Considerations,” in Karen Dawisha, ed., The 
International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia  
(Armonk: Sharpe, 1997), 7. 
32 But see Cecilia Chessa, “State Subsidies, International Diffusion, and Transnational Civil Society: The 
Case of Frankfurt-Oder and Subice,” East European Politics and Societies (February 2004); James Hughes, 
Gwendolyn Sasse, and Claire Gordon, “Saying ‘Maybe’ to the ‘Return to Europe’: Elites and the Political 
Space for Euroscepticism,” European Union Politics 3 (2002); and Henry E. Hale and Rein Taagepera, 
“Russia: Consolidation or Collapse?,” Europe-Asia Studies 54 (November 2002). For scholarship on 
geography as it relates to other aspects of post-communist transformation, see Michael Bradshaw and 
Jessica Prendergrast, “The Russian Heartland Revisited: An Assessment of Russia’s Transformation,” 
Eurasian Geography and Economics 46 (March 2005); in the same issue Andrei Treivish, “A New Russian 
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construction of the relevant theoretical frameworks, it has often been framed with 
reference to the widely cited dictum of Dunkwart Rustow about prerequisites for 
democratization. Key among these is the general agreement on the boundaries of the state 
and nation.33 In post-communist contexts, testimony to the influence of this premise is 
that the most extensively theorized territorial aspect of democratization has been the 
contestation of nation and state boundaries by minority ethnic groups.34 The emphasis on 
                                                                                                                                                 
Heartland: The Demographic and Economic Dimension”; Nicholas J. Lynn, “Geography and Transition: 
Reconceptualizing Systemic Change in the Former Soviet Union,” Slavic Review 58 (Winter 1999); and 
Fiona Hill and Clifford G. Gaddy, The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners Left Russia out in the 
Cold (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 
33 Dunkwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2 
(April 1970). 
34 Philip G. Roeder, “People and States after 1989: The Political Costs of Incomplete National 
Revolutions,” Slavic Review 58 (Winter 1999); Donna Bahry, “The New Federalism and the Paradoxes of 
Regional Sovereignty in Russia,” Comparative Politics 37 (January 2005); Mark R. Beissinger, “How 
Nationalisms Spread: Eastern Europe Adrift the Tides and Cycles of Nationalist Contention,” Social 
Research 63 (Spring 1996); Mark R. Beissinger, “Nationalist Violence and the State: Political Authority 
and Contentious Repertoires in the Former USSR,” Comparative Politics 30 (July 1998); Carol Skalnik 
Leff, “Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States: The Breakup of the Communist 
Federations,” World Politics 51 (January 1999); Dmitry Gorenburg, “Not With One Voice: An Explanation 
of Intragroup Variation in Nationalist Sentiment,” World Politics 53 (October 2000); David D. Laitin, 
Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1998); Daniel Treisman, “Russia’s ‘Ethnic Revival’: The Separatist Activism of Regional Leaders in 
a Post-Communist Order’,” World Politics 49 (January 1997); Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The 
Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); 
Charles King, “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States,” World Politics 
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ethnicity, however, shifts our focus away from other territory-specific factors, such as 
variations in sub-national democracy even in ethnically homogenous settings. At the 
same time, the modernist stress on national “boundedness” obscures the importance of 
territorial diffusion of external influences, which are dynamic and may serve to 
“unbound” national and local identities. 
Both within-nation regional variations in democracy and territorially uneven 
external influences on it have remained marginal to the debate on democratization. Such 
“whole-nation bias” is not unique to studies of post-communism; it has arguably 
dominated much of the recent research on political and economic liberalization in various 
contexts. Richard Snyder has rightly cautioned that “mean-spirited” analysis whereby 
national-level means are used in cross-country comparative studies may distort research 
results.35 In Mexico, for example, a national perspective on neoliberal reform would 
obscure the “diverse array of new institutions” at the sub-national level.36 In this and 
other Latin American states, Jonathan Fox finds “enclaves of authoritarianism” in 
otherwise democratizing national contexts, while Guillermo O’Donnell urges to 
                                                                                                                                                 
53 (July 2001); Henry E. Hale, “Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival 
and Collapse,” World Politics 56 (January 2004); Elise Giuliano, “Who Determines the Self in the Politics 
of Self-Determination: Identity and Preference Formation in Tatarstan’s Nationalist Mobilization,” 
Comparative Politics 32 (April 2000); Dmitry Gorenburg, Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian 
Federation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
35 Snyder (fn. 6), 101, 98. 
36 Richard Snyder, “After Neoliberalism: The Politics of Reregulation in Mexico,” World Politics 51 
(January 1999), 202. 
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distinguish between within-nation territorial “shades” of democracy.37 In other parts of 
the world, such as India, Patrick Heller finds variable “quality of democracy” at the sub-
national level. Generalizing to other countries, he argues that democracy can be built 
“from the bottom-up” even in contexts where national-level conditions may not be 
favorable to democratization.38 Most famously, Robert Putnam persuasively argues how 
local contexts determine whether democracy works or not.39  
The world’s biggest country, Russia is a good laboratory for exploring sub-
national democratic change.  Scholars now point to substantial disparities in levels of 
regional democracy—from variations in political party development—to variable local 
government strength and independence—to different levels of maturity of civil society 
and social capital.40 Explanations for these variations, however, have largely been sought 
                                                 
37 Jonathan Fox, “Latin America’s Emerging Local Politics,” Journal of Democracy 5 (April 1994); 
Guillermo O’Donnell, Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999). 
38 Patrick Heller, “Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India,” World Politics 52 (July 
2000), 517. 
39 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993). See also Juan J. Linz and Amando de Miguel, “Within-Nation Differences and 
Comparisons: The Eight Spains,” in R. L. Merritt and S. Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations: The Use of 
Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). 
40 Grigorii Golosov, Political Parties in the Regions of Russia: Democracy Unclaimed (Boulder: Lynne 
Rennier, 2004); Henry Hale, “Why not Parties? Electoral Markets, Party Substitutes, and Stalled 
Democratization in Russia,” Comparative Politics 37 (January 2005); Tomila V. Lankina, Governing the 
Locals: Local Self-Government and Ethnic Mobilization in Russia (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2004); Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional Governance 
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in domestic contexts. Although some studies now distinguish between more versus less 
“Westernized” regions,41 we have yet to establish causal relationships between a 
“Western” exposure and local political outcomes. 
A geographic incrementalist theory makes a specific link between the two 
variables, external and sub-national in highlighting their combined impact on democracy 
in the polity as a whole through processes of territorial diffusion and targeted aid.42  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Jeffrey W. Hahn, “How Democratic are Local Russian 
Deputies?,” in Carol R. Saivetz and Anthony Jones, eds., In Search of Pluralism: Soviet and Post-Soviet 
Politics (Boulder: Westview, 1994); Sarah L. Henderson, Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: 
Western Support for Grassroots Organizations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Robert W. 
Orttung, From Leningrad to St. Petersburg: Democratization in a Russian City (New York: St. Martin's, 
1995); Marie Mendras, “How Regional Elites Preserve Their Power,” Post-Soviet Affairs 15 (1999); 
Nikolai Petrov, “Regional Models of Democratic Development,” in Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, and 
Andrei Ryabov, eds., Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform 
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005); Vladimir Gelman, Sergei Ryzhenkov, 
Michael Brie, Boris Ovchinnikov, and Igor Semenov, Making and Breaking Democratic Transitions: The 
Comparative Politics of Russia’s Regions (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); Nicolai N. Petro, 
Crafting Democracy: How Novgorod has Coped with Rapid Social Change (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2004). 
41 Petrov (fn. 40).   
42 On external and sub-national interactions, see Ivo D. Duchacek, “Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a 
Typology of New Actors in International Relations,” in Hans J. Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos, eds., 
Federalism and International Relations: The Role of Subnational Units (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990). On 
how regionalism relates to globalization, see also Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Multi-Level 
Governance and European Integration,” in Gary Marks, ed., Governance in Europe (Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2001). 
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theory presupposes the existence of a powerful regional player, which could be one 
country or a union of states adhering to core democratic values.  Inevitably, there will be 
greater intensity of movement of people, goods, information, ideas, and technologies 
between this player and neighboring sub-national localities than those with a more remote 
location.43  The “naturalness” of these processes, which may have both negative and 
positive effects for adjacent territories, in turn forces governments to pursue regionally 
targeted policies aimed at either facilitating or curbing such exchanges, or at improving 
governance in a given neighboring unit to reduce the negative spillover effects from 
“problem” neighbors.  A combination of the “spontaneous” diffusion polices and targeted 
efforts will contribute to the development of geographically uneven patterns of change in 
one “neighborhood” country.           
As key Western player on the Eurasian landmass, the EU provides ample material 
for testing the theory. The EU project is premised upon the importance for democracy of 
both the “spontaneous” interactions of broader publics that serve to affirm a core set of 
democratic values, theorized by Karl Deutsch, and the targeted policies of carrot and 
stick aimed at national governments, known as conditionality.44 Studies of post-
communist countries that have already acceded to the EU testify to its impact on national 
                                                 
43 For a discussion, see Michael Keating, “Regions and International Affairs: Motives, Opportunities and 
Strategies,” in Francisco Aldecoa and Michael Keating, eds., Paradiplomacy in Action: The Foreign 
Relations of Subnational Governments (London: Frank Cass, 1999). 
44 Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and 
Measurement, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954). See also Jürgen Habermas, “Toward a Cosmopolitan 
Europe,” Journal of Democracy 14 (October 2003). 
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government policies and legal and institutional frameworks.45 The possible impact of the 
EU on domestic developments of non-candidate countries, even at a national level, 
however, has not been studied in any extensive fashion.  The EU’s effects on sub-national 
democracy levels in these states have been all but neglected.  In the following sections we 
seek to correct these important omissions by testing our theory in Russian regional 
settings. 
 
 
“Stocks” and “Flows” and Measures of Democracy 
 
In constructing an analytical framework for testing the theory, we draw on the 
Kopstein and Reilly World Politics article on geographic diffusion, which is undoubtedly 
one of the most interesting statements on the importance of geography and its impacts on 
post-communist democratic reform.46 Our analysis does not replicate that of Kopstein 
and Reilly, given the differences in the availability of regional, as opposed to national 
level statistics in Russia, as well as in our line of argumentation.  Another difference with 
their analysis is that we examine regional performance in relation to geographical 
proximity to just one set of external actors, West European democracies. Finally, we 
refine their method by constructing an original dataset of EU projects conducted in 
Russia’s regions as a measure of sub-national level targeted aid.  This is meant to 
                                                 
45 Milada Vachudová, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
46 Kopstein and Reilly (fn. 1).  Kopstein and Reilly also include a reference to “circumstance,” which in 
addition to “choice” has an impact on flows.   
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supplement the spontaneous diffusion measures and extend the analysis beyond the 
national level. 
Kopstein and Reilly sought to explain the divergent reform outcomes of post-
communist states based on their geographic location.  They found strong correlation 
between political performance and geographical distance from the West.  
Drawing insights from diffusion theories, they also distinguish between “stocks” 
and “flows,” with stocks representing “the assets, liabilities, or general qualities of a 
given unit, … [which] may be physical, political, economic, or cultural,” while “flows 
represent the movement of information and resources between countries.” Even if a 
country is favorably endowed with a certain “spatial stock,” such as a geographic location 
close to a Western democracy, “choice” might affect a given state’s degree of openness 
to external “flows.” “Choice” refers to decisions that states and individuals make with 
regard to opening or closing themselves to the outside world, and the willingness of 
external actors to influence them.  Examples of favorable “choices” would be EU leaders’ 
decision to invite a given country to join the Union, and the willingness of candidate 
countries to open themselves up to EU influences when faced with such prospects. The 
processes of diffusion or “flows” are therefore not unidirectional, are interactive in 
nature, and are affected not only by “stocks,” but also by conscious choices of individuals 
at both external and domestic levels.47 
In order to measure flows they construct an “openness” criterion, which examines 
domestic actor receptivity to external influences. The World Development Indicators that 
they use are number of televisions; newspaper circulation; outgoing international 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 13. 
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telecommunications; international inbound tourism; foreign direct investment; and 
international trade. They find that openness is positively correlated with political and 
economic reform.48 
Kopstein and Reilly then construct a more complex measure of “stocks.”  They 
suggest that “friends and neighbors” impact on neighboring states in ways that make 
them more similar to one another in terms of behavioral patterns.49 States, they find, form 
clusters of entities with similar levels of political and economic freedoms, with the 
democratic promoters located in the West and those with a trend to autocracy in Central 
Asia. 
Russia, curiously, in their analysis, emerges as not belonging to any cluster. They 
explain away this fact by suggesting that similar to other “remnant cores of formerly 
imperial powers,” it is “especially impervious to outside influences.”50 Fascinating as 
their arguments are with regard to spatial influences on domestic outcomes, they contain 
a puzzling contradiction, one that is in line with the whole-nation bias of the literature on 
democratization. While Kopstein and Reilly take as a starting point that location matters, 
they regard a country that spans eleven time zones, and is the largest in terms of the 
landmass that it covers, as one single unit of analysis. In other words, it does not appear 
to make a difference for their study whether one is in the Northern metropolis of St. 
Petersburg, in Siberia’s city of Chilym, or in the Far East’s town of Anadyr. 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 15. 
49 Ibid., 18. 
50 Ibid., 21. 
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 Clearly, if geography matters, then we should factor the variable and spatially 
uneven “friends and neighbors” democratizing effects on sub-national areas into the 
analysis of “stocks” and “flows.”   
Like Kopstein and Reilly, we hypothesize that proximity to West European 
democracies has a positive impact on regions located closest to them, and that this effect 
could be assessed by looking at trends in changes in openness and democracy over time.  
Our measure of distance or location “stock” is the number of kilometers between the 
closest capital of an established European democracy, Finland’s Helsinki, and that of a 
regional capital of each of Russia’s eighty-nine regions.  
In order to calculate “flows,” or the measure of openness, we created aggregate 
scores consisting of a range of sub-indicators related to trade, foreign investment, 
newspaper readership, and telecommunications.51  The measures are similar to those of 
Kopstein and Reilly, but also share the same validity limitations. Most of the sub-
indicators are classical measures of modernization and socio-economic development, and 
there is a high correlation between them and urbanization. The approach is therefore 
vulnerable to criticism that it would be hard to disentangle the effects of “flows” from 
standard modernization explanations of democratization. We explicitly acknowledge this 
limitation.  We address it in our analysis by controlling for other modernization aspects, 
such as urbanization, and establishing that our results, though sensitive to model 
specification, still hold.  We prefer to use the concept of “flows” as opposed to 
“modernization” because we analytically link it to “stocks” i.e., location, thereby also 
disentangling external effects from domestic factors.  We hypothesize that “stocks,” i.e., 
                                                 
51 Data on international tourism for the regions was not available from Goskomstat.  
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proximity to West European democracies, determines the speed and nature of “flows.” As 
such, we add an external and geographically focused dimension to our understandings of 
democratization, absent in classical modernization approaches. 
The most complete data for the widest range of the relevant sub-indicators was 
only available for the years 1999-2002.  This complicated an assessment of longer-term 
time trends. We therefore constructed additional openness scores composed of a smaller 
range of sub-indicators, but covering earlier years.  We then conducted a reliability test, 
which turned out to be highly significant for all the scores.  This allowed us to rely on the 
score with wider year coverage as a proxy for the more inclusive openness score in 
conducting data analysis.  The more inclusive openness scores were also used in other 
tests, which did not require wider year coverage. Detailed procedures for calculating the 
scores, as well as the results of the reliability test, are contained in Appendix 1.  
 We take the data on regional political democratization from the expert evaluation 
indexes that Nikolay Petrov and his collaborators compiled using the Freedom House 
method.52  These scholars composed one aggregate democracy score for 1991-2001.  The 
score was calculated by asking a panel of experts to examine developments in the regions 
for all these years and assign scores on a five-point scale to each of the ten spheres that 
were deemed important for assessing the overall democracy climate in the regions.  For 
                                                 
52 This is based on Moscow Carnegie Center’s project on socio-political monitoring of the regions and 
modeled on Freedom House surveys of democracy. Petrov (fn. 40), 242-47.  Results compiled by Nikolay 
Petrov and Aleksey Titkov are available from the website of the Independent Institute of Social Politics, 
http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml (accessed September 20, 2006).  The “moving average” 
time periods were also selected to correspond with the federal electoral cycles for the periods of 1999-2003 
and 2000-2004.     
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example, judicial independence was assessed by looking at court cases covering all these 
years.  These ten scores were then added up to form the overall democracy score, with the 
lowest possible score being ten and the highest fifty.  They used this technique to register 
temporal changes in a more systematic way starting from 1999, by creating “moving 
average” scores for 1999-2003 and 2000-2004.  The experts would make annual 
adjustments to each of the ten sub-indicators based on shifts in the respective spheres 
however they chose to use a moving average method, rather than year by year indicators.  
This is because a major change in one year, such as gubernatorial election and turnover in 
one region may substantially affect the overall score and would present an inaccurate 
picture unless subsequent gubernatorial elections in later years in other regions are 
factored in. This technique, also called the “exponentially mapped past average,” is most 
commonly used to reduce stochastic noise effects, which might otherwise complicate the 
uncovering of underlying trends.53   The average is adjusted to eliminate cyclical 
variations, which reduces random fluctuations.  A detailed description of the democracy 
index is in Appendix 2.54  Figure 1 is a good visual presentation of democracy levels and 
variations based on Petrov’s scores.     
                                                 
53 Jianquing Fan and Qiwei Yao, Nonlinear Time Series: Nonparametric and Parametric Methods (New 
York: Springer, 2003), 217; http://members.aol.com/wsiler/chap13.htm (accessed July 15, 2006). 
54 The scores for “democratization” or “democracy” as applied to regional contexts were used in relative 
terms. Petrov’s method does not imply that regions at the top of the ranking are necessarily democracies, 
but that relative to other regions they have higher levels of political pluralism, electoral competitiveness, 
media freedom, economic liberalization, civil society, judicial independence, elite turnover, and so forth. 
“Competitive authoritarianism” may capture well the political processes in many of Russia’s regions. 
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regime Change in Peru and 
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Figure 1: Map of regional democracy based on Petrov’s scores. 
 
We begin the analysis of these variations by establishing basic correlation patterns 
between the distance, openness, and democracy variables before aid is factored in, and 
trends over time are explored in a more systematic fashion.  Initial tests between the 1999 
openness score,55 and the moving average democracy scores for 1999-2003 and 2000-
2004, reveal a strong positive correlation.  There is also a correspondence between a 
favorable location “stock” and levels of regional openness, with the more distant location 
negatively associated with levels of openness. The more Western regions are also better 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ukraine in Comparative Perspective, Studies in Public Policy, no. 355 (Strathclyde: Center for the Study of 
Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 2001). 
55 I.e., allowing a one year lag.   
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democratic performers. These results are presented in Table 1.  While they tell us little 
about the actual direction of causality and the significance of other factors that might be 
at work, they are a first step in creating a model for assessing the impact of external 
factors on democracy. 
Table 1* 
Distance, Democracy, and Openness 
 
 Democracy,  
1999-03 
Democracy,  
2000-04 
Distance from 
Helsinki 
Openness 1999*** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Distance from Helsinki 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N = 88 
  .595** 
  .000 
 -.281** 
  .008 
  .595** 
  .000  
 -.280** 
  .008 
 -.386** 
   .000  
 1.000 
 
* Here and in Tables 3 and 4 Chechnya has been excluded due to missing data. 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level. 
*** The 1999-2003 openness score was used. 
 
 
Geography, Aid, and Democracy 
 
Our next step is to factor the impact of Western aid into the analysis since 
diffusion is just one dimension of Western influences, and “flows” may not automatically 
translate into greater democracy. Political reform is often a product of decisions of 
domestic elites or pressure of foreign governments and politicians.56 
As is well known, Russia’s prospects for EU membership have always been dim, 
while President Putin’s “managed democracy”57 has done little to improve them.58 
                                                 
56 Kopstein and Reilly (fn. 1), 28-30. 
57 Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: The Russian 
Elections of 1999 and 2000 (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 
58 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Relations with 
Russia, February 9, 2004, 
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Nevertheless, over the last fifteen years, the EU has provided substantial volumes of aid 
to Russia,59 over 2.6 billion Euros, within the framework of the Technical Assistance to 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, (TACIS) program, aimed at “promot[ing] the 
transition to a market economy and . . . reinforc[ing] democracy and the rule of law.”60   
The EU’s pursuit of these objectives is consistent with its external relations 
priorities of a “normative power.”61  The security of the Union itself is of course an 
important objective in EU external aid policies.  This objective is linked with democracy 
promotion however, the assumption being that peace and economic prosperity of the 
Union is enhanced when its neighbor shares with it fundamental democratic values. 
 How does the EU select the agencies that it funds as part of this agenda among a 
plurality of recipient regions?  Two key criteria can be identified from an examination of 
EU funding documents.  The first could be summarized as “geography matters”: In what 
the EU refers to as the “proximity agenda,” it tends to allocate large volumes of aid to 
neighboring developing and post-communist countries. In the Russian context, aid to sub-
national regions located in geographical proximity to the EU has become an increasingly 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/russia_docs/com04_106_en.pdf (accessed September 
20, 2006). See, however, David Gowan, How the EU Can Help Russia (London: Centre for European 
Reform, 2000), 43-44. 
59 The EU spends a large share of overall aid on democratic assistance. In 1990-1999, it amounted to 19 
percent. Mendelson and Glenn (fn. 3), 6.   
60  See http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/ (accessed February 15, 2006).  See 
Appendix 2 for a discussion of the democracy component of EU aid. 
61 Hiski Haukkala, “The Relevance of Norms and Values in the EU's Russia Policy,” Working Paper, no. 
52 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2005), 5. 
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important aspect of this wider objective.  This proximity agenda has been in turn 
influenced by Russia’s closest neighbors in the EU. 
Policy-makers in Brussels would be hard-pressed to admit that Russia’s Western 
regions are now in Europe’s focus, and prefer to speak of their “partnership” with the 
country as a whole. Nevertheless, what started off in the early 1990s as a program to 
assist the whole of Russia, as well as CIS states with weak or no prospects for EU 
membership, has over the years increasingly acquired a Western, and Northern, 
regionally focused dimension. The Nordic states, Finland in particular, but also Sweden 
and Denmark, have been influential in this politics of bon voisinage.62 The Cold War era 
marginal status of these countries as Europe’s Nordic periphery has given way to their 
increasing assertiveness in setting Europe’s agenda vis-à-vis her Eastern neighbors. A 
liberal focus on “soft,” rather than hard, security issues, characteristic of their 
involvement in world affairs in general, now became their trademark feature in relations 
with Russia. Such post-modern jargon as the “de-bordering” of borders and the “de-
othering” of others now peppered the discourse of their politicians shaping policy vis-à-
vis Russia.63 The whole concept of border was in fact argued to be the product of long 
                                                 
62 Concept employed in Alan Henrikson, “Facing across Borders: The Diplomacy of Bon Voisinage,” 
International Political Science Review 21 (April 2000). 
63 Thomas Diez, “Europe as a Discursive Battleground: Discourse Analysis and European Integration 
Studies,” Cooperation and Conflict 36 (March 2001), 11. On Nordicness, see Pirjo Jukarainen, “Norden is 
Dead – Long live the Eastwards Faced Euro-North: Geopolitical Re-making of Norden in a Nordic 
Journal,” Cooperation and Conflict 34 (December 1999). On Nordic discourse, see Christopher S. 
Browning, “Coming Home or Moving Home? ‘Westernizing Narratives in Finnish Foreign Policy and the 
Reinterpretation of Past Identities,” Cooperation and Conflict 37 (March 2002); Viatcheslav Morozov, 
 27 
dated Realpolitik conceptions of the world, and is to be replaced with greater stress on the 
fuzzier “boundary” or “frontier.”64  
These conceptions became more salient after the latest round of accession of new 
states to the EU. With the membership of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Europe 
also acquired a Russian exclave, Kaliningrad, and miles of shared borders with other 
Northwestern regions. The recognition that “the wild East begins just across the border” 
did not simply lead Europe to wall itself off against the problem neighbor.65 
Environmental pollution does not recognize political boundaries or security checkpoints, 
nor do crime or HIV/AIDS or tuberculosis. Addressing these issues of common concern 
requires support for democratic institutions on the other side of the border, such as free 
media, civil society organizations, an independent judiciary system, and transparent and 
responsive local and regional governments. The EU’s most recent European 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Russia in the Baltic Sea Region: Desecuritization or Deregionalization?,” Cooperation and Conflict 39 
(September 2004). On the role of Nordic states in world affairs, see Christine Ingebritsen, “Norm 
Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia’s Role in World Politics,” Cooperation and Conflict 37 (March 2002). 
64 While border is “an unambiguous concept referring to territorial, geographic and recognizable borders of 
the union defined by membership,” the “boundaries differ as extension of boundaries does not require 
widening the union but application of governance patterns below the membership line.” Mette Sicard 
Filtenborg, Stefan Gaenzle, and Elisabeth Johansson, “An Alternative Theoretical Approach to EU Foreign 
Policy: ‘Network Governance’ and the Case of the Northern Dimension Initiative,” Cooperation and 
Conflict 37 (December 2002), 394, 389.  
65 Reference to article that appeared in Helsingin Sanomat. Browning (fn. 63), 57.  “The Wild East” 
reference also appeared in the book by Victor M. Sergeev, The Wild East: Crime and Lawlessness in Post-
Communist Russia (London: Sharpe 1998). 
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Neighborhood Policy, which replaces TACIS with a new set of funding programs, has 
further reinforced the regional and frontier dimension of EU aid.66  
The second important EU criterion could be labeled “rewarding good achievers.”  
“Commitment to reform is critical to TACIS performance and should be rewarded,” 
stated one recent EU document for example, urging “greater selectivity of assistance, 
[and] focusing on areas with proven reform commitment.”67  
If these criteria do apply to sub-national territories, then they might turn out to be 
conflicting in practice.  What if a region with “proven reform commitment” is not exactly 
located in the EU’s neighborhood, while one lacking such commitment is right on the 
                                                 
66 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/policy_en.htm (accessed February 11, 2005). On the Northern 
Dimension, see Christopher S. Browning, “Competing or Complementary Policies? Understanding the 
Relationship between the NEI and NDI,” Working Paper (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research 
Institute, 2002); and Peer H. Lange, “Die Nördliche Dimension: Europäische Energie Versorgung und 
Sicherheit,” Internationale Politik 1 (January 2001). The US under Clinton came up with a similar 
initiative. See Christopher S. Browning, “A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Regional Cooperation: The 
EU States and the Northern European Initiative,” European Security 10 (Winter 2001). On approaches to 
security in the region, see Clive Archer, “Nordic Swans and Baltic Cygnets,” Cooperation and Conflict 34 
(March 1999); Hans Mouritzen, “Security Communities in the Baltic Sea Region,” Security Dialogue 32 
(September 2001); Hans-Joachim Spanger, “Moral versus Interesse? Die Ambivalenz westlicher 
Demokratiehilfe für Rußland,” Osteuropa 52 (July 2002). 
67 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/consultations/cswp_tacis.htm (accessed February 15, 2006). 
For an in-depth analysis of EU aid motives in Russia’s regions as they relate to other factors, such as 
foreign investment, see Tomila Lankina, “Explaining European Union Aid to Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 
21 (December 2005). 
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EU’s border?  An examination of EU aid allocation to Russia’s regions helps address 
these questions. 
A mere glance at the map of TACIS local support offices (LSOs) hints at the 
territorially uneven patterns of aid flows (Figure 2). Of the nine LSOs, four are located in 
Russia’s Northwest, and none of the others are much further than Western Siberia. If the 
location of these bureaus is any indication of the EU’s view of Europe, it is one stretching 
from Atlantic to the Urals, and not—all the way to Vladivostok.68  
  
                                                 
68 On geographic conceptions of Europe, see Mark Webber, ed., Russia and Europe: Conflict or 
Cooperation? (London: Macmillan, 2000); Iver B. Newmann, Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in 
Identity and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1996); Iver B. Newmann, Uses of the Other: The 
“East” in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); William 
Wallace, “From the Atlantic to the Bug, from the Arctic to the Tigris? The Transformation of the EU and 
NATO,” International Affairs 76 (July 2000); and in the same issue Vladimir Baranovsky, “Russia: A Part 
of Europe or Apart from Europe?” 
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Figure 2: Map, TACIS LSOs. 
 
Figure 3 shows that recipients are largely clustered in Russia’s Northwest, and, to 
a lesser extent Central, Volga-Urals, and West Siberian regions. Only a tiny number of 
projects were conducted in the Southern Federal District, and aid to the Far East was 
virtually non-existent. There is therefore a very strong geographical, Western, dimension 
to EU aid, with aid thinning out as we move southwards and eastwards.69 
                                                 
69 The first projects were conducted in 1992. Numbers of projects conducted by year: 1992: 31; 1993: 49; 
1994: 81; 1995: 88; 1996: 90; 1997: 108; 1998: 135; 1999: 91; 2000: 53; 2001: 119; 2002: 124; 2003: 89; 
2004: 58; 2005: 2.  Source: compiled by author from project data available from 
http://62.38.207.105/tacis/en/index.asphttp://www.tacis-lso-rf.org/en/objectives.asp (accessed November 
15, 2005). Project data for 2003-2005 suggests that there have been fewer projects.  Alexander Berdino, 
head of the Petrozavodsk LSO maintained that there is often a time lag before data on projects in a given 
LSO are added to the TACIS website database.  His data for Petrozavodsk LSO show that projects running 
in 2004-2005 (18) are consistent with averages for the last years.  Tacis funding instruments for Russia are 
currently being restructured however, it would not be reflected in the 2003-2005 data because these 
projects had been approved earlier.  Author interview, Petrozavodsk, January 18, 2006.     
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Figure 3: Map, density of EU aid. The map key indicates numbers of projects conducted in the respective 
regions, 1992-2005. 
 
Interestingly, some of the more remote regions have been beneficiaries of 
substantial volumes of aid.  Table 2 indicates that if a region has a Northwest location, it 
is likely to obtain a large volume of funding even if it does not have the highest 
democracy scores. By contrast, the non-Northwest Federal District recipient regions are 
usually high democratic achievers relative to other regions.70  So the “geography matters” 
                                                 
70 Petrov (fn. 40). Aspects of democratic development, such as openness and capacity of NGOs are often 
themselves products of Western aid. Henderson (fn. 40); Mendelson and Glenn (fn. 3); Lisa McIntosh 
Sundstrom, “Strength from Without? Transnational Actors and NGO Development in Russia” (Ph.D. Diss., 
Stanford University, 2001); author interview with Venedikt Dostovalov and Nadejhda Donovskaya, NGO 
Veche, Pskov, August 27, 2004. Other studies also found similar patterns of aid going to areas that are 
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criterion becomes less important when the EU wants to reward “good achievers” in the 
more remote regions.  Even in this case, though, project activity in the “more remote” 
regions does not extend much further beyond Western Siberia.  At the same time, 
“rewarding good achievers” is not uniformly applied in locations where “geography 
matters.”71    
Table 2 
Regions with Largest Number of Projects, Their Per Capita Volume,   
Democracy Ranking, and Location 
  
Region Number 
of 
Projects 
Cumulative 
Aid Per 
Capita, 
1992-2005 
(Euros) 
Democracy 
Ranking 
Border Status / 
Northwest (NW)  
or Other Federal 
District (FD)  
St. Petersburg 262 25.89 1 Border NW FD 
Kaliningrad 83 49.38 12 Border NW FD 
Novosibirsk 53 18.08 8 Siberia FD 
Karelia 52 55.36 3 Border NW FD 
Leningrad 47 12.60 18 Border NW FD 
Nijegorodskaya 27 3.54 5 Volga FD 
Murmansk 24 18.30 24 Border NW FD 
Sverdlovsk 24 4.90 2 Urals FD 
Kemerovo 21 9.81 41 Siberia FD 
Perm 20 2.10 4 Volga FD 
Pskov 19 2.42 46 Border NW FD 
Arkhangelsk 17 3.26 6 Non-Border NW FD 
Novgorod 16 1.72 25 Non-Border NW FD 
Moscow City 16 .30 27 Central FD 
                                                                                                                                                 
relatively well off. Kees Biekart, The Politics of Civil Society Building: European Private Aid Agencies and 
Democratic Transitions in Central America (Utrecht: International Books, 1999), 298.  
71 On aid motives, see Joseph Jupille, James A. Caporaso, and Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Integrating Institutions: 
Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union,” Comparative Political Studies 36 
(February/March 2003); in same issue Frank Schimmelfennig, “Strategic Interaction in a Community 
Environment: The Decision to Enlarge the EU to the East”; and Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and 
Bruce Taylor, “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and 
Swedish Aid Flows,” World Politics 50 (January 1998). 
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Udmurtiya 15 1.30 14 Volga FD 
 
Simple bivariate exercises presented in Table 3 suggest that if we take total aid 
volumes in both gross and per capita terms for all the years, the further we move from the 
West, the less likelihood there is of a region obtaining EU aid.  This relationship is not 
very strong, however. Moreover, if we divide aid into smaller, three-year sub-periods, we 
also see differences over time in the significance of relationship between distance and 
aid.  This discrepancy is probably due to the simple fact that three years may be too short 
a term for making solid inferences about time trends.  Still, on balance, the results 
confirm that distance alone does not affect aid flows, though the strong correlation 
between distance and gross aid volumes for the later, 2000-2003, sub-period, does 
suggest a recent trend towards greater role of proximity.   
Table 3 
Distance and Aid Volumes, Per Capita and Gross,  
Total and by Three-Year Sub-Periods 
 
 Distance from Helsinki Sig. (2-tailed) 
Aid per capita, 1992-05 
 
Aid per capita, 1992-95 
Aid per capita, 1996-99 
Aid per capita, 2000-03 
 
Gross aid, 1992-05 
 
Gross aid, 1992-95 
Gross aid, 1996-99 
Gross aid, 2000-03 
N = 88 
 -.227** 
  
 -.208 
 -.196 
 -.198 
  
-.211* 
 
 -.150 
 -.198 
 -.302** 
.034 
 
.052 
.067 
.064 
 
.048 
 
.163 
.066 
.004 
       *   Correlation is significant at the .05 level. 
       ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level. 
 
 
The results of bivariate exercises presented in Table 4 confirm that prior regional 
democracy levels have a strong positive association with aid levels: “good achievers” do 
get rewarded. 
 34 
 
Table 4 
Impact of Democracy on Aid Allocation 
 
 Democracy, 1991-01 Sig. (2-tailed) 
Aid per capita, 2002-05 
Gross aid, 2002-05 
N = 88 
 .332** 
 .496** 
.002 
.000 
       ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level. 
 
 
Project records also indicate that the Muslim republics in the Volga-Urals and 
Southern areas of Russia cooperated in very few projects, with the North Caucasus 
republics in particular standing out for the virtual absence of TACIS regional aid. An 
important factor militating against simplistic culturalist explanations of these aid choices 
is that republics with large or predominantly Muslim populations also have some of the 
lowest intra-regional democracy ratings.72 In Petrov’s democracy indexes for 1991-2001, 
all but two of the Muslim entities rank among the bottom twenty regions.  If democracy 
is the driver behind EU’s involvement in a geographically remote region, then it might 
explain these aid patterns. 
Given the geographically uneven nature of aid, of diffusion processes from the 
West, and the plurality of domestic factors that could be affecting regional democracy, 
how do we begin to uncover the mechanisms that might be at work?   
 
The Model 
 
In order to explore how aid and a region’s geographical location affect democracy 
over time, we conducted analysis using population averaged panel data models on the 
                                                 
72 Petrov (fn. 40). On Islam and political authority patterns worldwide, see M. Steven Fish, “Islam and 
Authoritarianism,” World Politics 55 (October 2002). 
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regions.   Because we only have two-period data for the dependent variable, democracy, 
our panel is made of two-period observations for each region. In particular, we have two 
moving average democracy scores covering the years 1999-2003 and 2000-2004. We 
label these data points as 1999 and 2000, for convenience.  Ten regions were excluded 
from analysis: Chechnya and nine autonomous territories whose administrative status 
changed in the course of the 1990s and for which limited data were available.73  The 
number of groups after excluding the above regions is seventy-nine. Therefore, the panel 
data has 158 observations. 
The independent variables in the panel seek to capture both the key domestic 
factors arguably affecting democratization, such as urbanization and religion, and 
external ones, such as aid per capita and distance, as well as openness, which is 
conceptually linked to both of these factors.  These variables include two time invariant 
variables and three time variant ones.  We experimented with different time lags, lagging 
the time variant variables by two, three, and four years, with values going back to 1997, 
1996, and 1995, respectively.  The first time invariant regressor is a dummy variable for 
“Muslim republics,” which takes a value of 1 if a region’s titular group (i.e., Tatars in 
Tatarstan, Bashkirs in Bashkortostan, etc.) is predominantly Muslim and 0 otherwise.   
“Distance from the West” is the second time invariant variable.  The three time variant 
variables are urbanization—which is among the key domestic factors that scholars have 
put forward to explain regional democracy levels—openness, and EU aid.   
                                                 
73 Aginsk-Buryatsk, Komy-Permyak, Nenetsk, Taymyr-Dolgano-Nenetsk, Ust-Orda-Buryat, Evenk, 
Yamalo-Nenetsk, Khanty-Mansiysk, Koryak Autonomous Districts. 
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The time variant variables were lagged to avoid problems of endogeneity as they 
are used to explain democracy outcomes in 1999 and 2000. In particular, the lags were 
constructed on the assumption that each variable takes time to have an effect on 
democratic outcomes. For instance, the cumulative effect of aid on democracy takes time, 
at least two years, such that aid allocated in 1997, calculated as explained below, affects 
democracy in 1999, and aid in 1998 affects democracy in 2000, with the same pattern 
holding for the other time variant variables.  Similar logic applies to the three and four 
year lags. 
The impact of aid was calculated by constructing four year moving averages for 
aid per capita. Thus, the 1997 two year lagged value is based on the 1994-1997 average 
of per capita volume of aid, the 1996 three year lagged value—on the 1993-1996 average 
of per capita volume of aid, and the 1995 four year lagged value—on the 1992-1995 
average of per capita volume of aid.  The logic behind this calculation is that aid volumes 
may vary substantially from year to year.  A moving average therefore provides a more 
accurate picture of aid trends over time.  In addition, because aid has a cumulative effect, 
it is the average volumes of aid in per capita terms allocated up until a certain year that 
have an impact on democracy, rather than just the volume of aid in one particular year.  
The 1998 two year lagged value is in turn based on the 1995-1998 average aid per capita, 
the 1997 three year lagged value—on the 1994-1997 average aid per capita, and the 1996 
four year lagged value—on the 1993-1996 average aid per capita. 
The panel structure of the data yields information from variation within a panel, in 
this case a region, as well as across panels or regions. In general, panel data estimators 
avoid the shortcomings of traditional regression methods such as OLS, which ignore 
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intra- or within-panel correlation. OLS treats all observations as independent and 
underestimates the variance of estimated group effects, when repeated measures are 
obtained on the same unit over a number of years. 
 Various panel data methods overcome such shortcomings and provide estimates 
of the effects of independent variables that vary over time within a region as well as 
across regions. These include within or fixed effects, random effects and between 
estimators. The between estimator uses panel averaged values and does not consider 
within panel variation. Therefore, we do not consider this estimator. The within or fixed 
effects estimator is used when unobserved region effects may be correlated with the 
independent variables. Within estimation, however, does not allow the inclusion of time 
invariant regressors, which are important in our model. In addition, when between or 
across region variation is very important, the within estimator that produces correct 
estimates will be highly inefficient and, thus, not meaningful. The random effects 
estimator produces correct, in the sense of being consistent, estimates that are more 
efficient if panel effects are uncorrelated with regressors. This condition, however, may 
not hold up. 
 As an alternative to both of these approaches, we can consider the population-
averaged estimator, also known as the General Estimating Equations (GEE). This 
estimator also controls for effects that are due to unobserved region specific effects as 
well as within-region correlation. Unlike the random and fixed effects estimators, 
however, GEE accounts for within-panel dependence by averaging effects over all 
panels. Specifically, it uses panel-level correlation that is estimated by averaging 
information from all panels. The estimated effects resulting from GEE are interpreted as 
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those of an average region rather than a specific region. In addition, these average effects 
are not required to be uncorrelated with the regressors.74 
The estimation results using this estimator are presented in Table 5.  With the 
exception of the Muslim dummy, all values in the regression have been logged.  The 
coefficients can, therefore, be interpreted as capturing a percentage change in democracy 
for one percentage change in each explanatory variable. 
                                                 
74 Glenn W. Harrison, “House Money Effects in Public Good Experiments: Comment,” Experimental 
Economics, forthcoming (April 2006) 6, fn. 7. 
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Table 5 
Impact of Aid and Geographic Location on Regional Democracy over Time:  
Results with Four-Year Aid Moving Averages 
 
Variable         Coefficient              z Sig. 
Two-Year Lags 
Distance from Helsinki -.0547251              -2.20    0.028     
Muslim region  -.2534075     -3.85     0.000 
Urbanization .3100629    3.07      0.002     
Aid moving average .0587831    2.04      0.041      
Openness  .0308972    2.37      0.018      
Constant 2.377226        4.91   0.000 
Three-Year Lags    
Distance from Helsinki -.0618649    -2.46    0.014     
Muslim region  -.2569649    -3.82    0.000 
Urbanization .3428157    3.37    0.001       
Aid moving average .0351532    2.06    0.040      
Openness  .01122    1.13    0.258 
Constant 2.349788    4.76 0.000 
Four-Year Lags    
Distance from Helsinki -.0621527    -2.44    0.015     
Muslim region  -.2576626    -3.79    0.000 
Urbanization .3410499    3.29    0.001      
Aid moving average .0275352    1.44 0.150 
Openness  .0178403    1.36 0.175 
Constant 2.347109    4.71    0.000 
N = 158                                           
 
 
 
The results with the two year lags show that the parameter estimates for the 
Muslim republic dummy, distance, openness, urbanization, and aid are statistically 
significantly different from zero at least at a 95 percent confidence level.  The model 
shows that regions located at a greater distance from the West are less likely to 
democratize than those located in greater proximity to it.  In particular, for a 1 percent 
increase in distance from the West, the democracy level decreases by .055 percent within 
a period of two years. Aid per capita and openness, on the other hand, have a positive 
effect on democracy. For 1 percent increase in aid, the democracy level increases by .059 
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percent, while with a 1 percent increase in the openness score, the level of democracy 
increases by .031 percent.  For “Muslim” regions, compared to the “non-Muslim” ones, 
the democracy score is less by 25 percent holding all other effects fixed. Holding the 
effect of religion constant, urbanization remains the strongest predictor of democracy: for 
1 percent increase in urbanization, democracy increases by .31 percent.  The results are 
similar with three and four year lags except that openness is not statistically significantly 
different from zero at a 95 percent confidence level, which suggests that it is sensitive to 
different model specifications.  The coefficients for aid also decrease with the three and 
four year lags.  While the three year lag parameter for aid remains statistically significant, 
the four year lag one is not statistically significantly different from zero at a 95 percent 
confidence level.  Based on these results we conclude that the effect of aid allocations 
that are more distant in time is not as strong as those of more recent ones. 
In order to test further for the robustness of the findings, we created an alternative, 
cumulative, measure of aid, lagged by two, three, and four years.  For example, with the 
two year lag, for the cumulative aid 1997 figure, we added up per capita aid for the years 
1992-1997; and for the cumulative aid 1998 figure, we added the per capita aid for the 
years 1992-1998.  In other words, in this measure we include all aid that had been 
allocated up until 1997 and 1998, rather than just using a moving average of four years.  
Similar logic has been applied to constructing the three and four year lags.  The 
assumption behind this measure is that aid volumes allocated in the earlier years of post-
communist development might provide essential infrastructure or other resources, which 
serve as a basis for the effectiveness of subsequent aid allocations.  For example, an NGO 
might have received a grant to purchase computer equipment in 1992.  This equipment 
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would be important for advocacy or other activities supported by aid allocated in later 
years.    
When we substituted the above aid measure, which we also logged, for the 
moving average aid measure used in the previous models, we find that the results still 
hold.  Openness, though, in this set of regressions, is significant at slightly under the 90 
percent confidence level for the two year lag model, and is not statistically significant for 
the three and four year lag models.  This confirms that the findings with respect to this 
variable, similar to results from the set of models presented in Table 5, are somewhat 
sensitive to model specification.  
  
Table 6 
Impact of Aid and Geographic Location on Regional Democracy over Time:  
Results with Cumulative Aid Per Capita 
 
Variable         Coefficient              z Sig. 
Two-Year Lags    
Distance from Helsinki -.0634435               -2.52 0.012     
Muslim region  -.2542543    -3.77 0.000 
Urbanization .3491942    3.43 0.001     
Cumulative Aid .0008614    2.87 0.004      
Openness  .0210344    1.61 0.107      
Constant 2.310157       4.68 0.000 
Three-Year Lags                      
Distance from Helsinki -.0594805                -2.35          0.019     
Muslim region  -.2555356                -3.79 0.000     
Urbanization .3398495      3.33                    0.001      
Cumulative Aid .0202944                 2.05 0.040      
Openness  .0094663                0.93          0.351     
Constant 2.345596               4.75        0.000 
Four-Year Lags                      
Distance from Helsinki -.060123                -2.36 0.019     
Muslim region  -.2568535        -3.78                  0.000    
Urbanization .3358704                 3.25            0.001      
Cumulative Aid .0180761             1.89             0.059     
Openness  .0182061    1.39    0.163     
Constant 2.350531    4.72    0.000 
N = 158    
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Table 6 shows that the coefficients in this regression are not vastly different from 
those in the previous one, except that the aid coefficient for the two-year lag is 
substantially lower: for 1 percent increase in cumulative aid, the democracy level 
increases by .0008 percent.  This difference in the aid coefficients suggests that aid 
volumes allocated in later years, as reflected in our four-year moving average figure, 
might be a better predictor of democracy outcomes than the cumulative aid figure going 
back to the earliest days of aid allocation.  Most likely, this is a reflection of the 
limitations of the data we are working with, namely, the availability of only two time 
points for democracy scores.  If the scores were available for the whole of the 1990s 
decade, better assessments could have been made about aid allocations in the early years 
and democracy outcomes prior to 1999.75 
Still, for the purposes of our analysis, the most important finding is that even 
controlling for such domestic factors as openness, urbanization, and being a Muslim 
republic, distance from the West and foreign aid emerge as important predictors of 
democracy. We should also keep in mind that the logic behind creating the openness 
score was to assess levels of domestic receptivity to external influences. The above 
                                                 
75 The 2 year lag with moving average aid has the highest coefficient among our aid measures.  This 
bolsters our finding that aid allocated in later years might be a better predictor of democratic outcomes than 
that allocated in earlier years. Later openness indicators might be likewise better predictors of democracy 
than measures going back further in time, though caution should be exercised in making inferences about 
the respective temporal lags due to data limitations stemming from only two time points for the democracy 
score. For illustrative purposes, results from an OLS regression with 2 year lags are presented in Appendix 
1.   
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findings further justify the inclusion of external effects variables in explanations of 
democratization processes in a given national or sub-national context.  In making this 
assertion, we do not belittle the impact of domestic factors most often invoked in 
modernization approaches to democratization: our analysis provides straightforward 
confirmation that the urbanization variable is the strongest predictor of regional 
democracy.  And yet it also confirms our premise that greater stress should be laid on 
external factors in explaining regional political outcomes. 
 
 
Karelia and Pskov 
 
Two frontier regions, Karelia and Pskov, illustrate how geography has made a 
difference both for external aid choices and levels of democracy. Karelia, a region with 
high levels of initial openness demonstrates how proximity to the West and aid could 
further reinforce a region’s democracy level. Pskov, by contrast, shows how even regions 
with low levels of initial openness and democracy could be transformed due to sustained 
Western engagement. 
Karelia shares a 740 kilometer-long border with Finland.76 Parts of Karelia 
belonged to Finland before World War II, however during the Soviet period this frontier 
location was a disadvantage. Karelia was also part of a regional security cluster during 
the Cold War, which was one of the most highly militarized zones in the world. In 
                                                 
76 Parts of what is now the Republic of Karelia, formerly belonging to Finland, were incorporated into the 
USSR during the 1939-1944 Soviet-Finnish wars.  
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economic terms, such as its level of industrial production, Karelia was also behind many 
localities.   
From the outset of post-communist transformation, nonetheless, Karelia ranked as 
one of Russia’s more open and, relative to other regions, more democratic, sub-national 
entities. It was the second republic, in 1990, to declare sovereignty. Rather than 
proceeding to use its center-regional treaty-based authority to undermine political 
pluralism, as did many other republics, Karelia’s regional leaders chose a different path 
of development.  Karelia became one of the few regions to boast a local party system.  It 
also has one of Russia’s most active and diverse NGO communities. The level of its 
media independence is also assessed to be higher than in most Russia’s regions. In 
Petrov’s latest ranking of regional democracy for 2000-2004, Karelia is among the top 
three Russian regions.77 
We argue that it is Karelia’s Western-looking orientation at both elite or 
leadership and societal levels, combined with a commitment to the republic’s political 
and economic reform by its neighbor Finland, and subsequently the EU and other 
European actors, that accounts for the peculiarity of its development trajectory.  The 
individual credited with placing Karelia firmly on Europe’s map is also one of the few 
senior Russian regional politicians with extensive exposure to the West. Valery 
Shlyamin, Karelia’s Minister of Foreign Relations and Economic Development between 
1992 and 2002, has been the USSR’s78 trade attaché in Helsinki from 1978 to 1982, and 
                                                 
77 After St. Petersburg and Sverdlovsk oblasti. Petrov  (fn. 40). It was also found to have the lowest 
reported amount of corruption among Russian regions. Phyllis Dininio and Robert Orttung. “Explaining 
Patterns of Corruption in the Russian Regions,” World Politics 57 (July 2005). 
78 http://www.gov.karelia.ru/gov/News/2004/02/0224_11.html (accessed February 21, 2005). 
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is fluent in English and Finnish.79 While other regions lacked a clear foreign policy 
vision, Shlyamin perceived the importance of a Western orientation. Since the early 
1990s he and other regional officials were frequently seen in Helsinki, Brussels, and 
other European capitals lobbying for project aid and promoting Karelia as an open 
region.80  
In what was a two-way process, in the early 1990s, the European actors, the Finns 
in particular, sponsored many reform initiatives in the republic. Finland’s involvement in 
Karelia intensified after its accession to the EU in 1995. Now eligible for EU funding, 
Finland saw its membership as an opportunity both for increasing its influence on 
Russia’s Western frontier regions, as well as on the EU’s strategic thinking with regard to 
its Eastern neighbor. In 2000, the EU established a Euregio Karelia covering three 
Finnish border counties and Karelia as the first Euroregion on the border between the EU 
and Russia.81 This made Finland eligible for millions of Euro that it could spend on 
cooperation projects with Karelia. 
The involvement of the Finns, other Nordic states, and the EU in Karelia became 
so massive that it is no longer appropriate to describe Western aid as being “thinly 
spread” in this particular region.82 A republic of only 716,000 people, it was a beneficiary 
of hundreds of aid projects at various levels from the EU, national, regional and 
                                                 
79 Bio available at http://www.gov.karelia.ru/gov/Power/Ministry/Relations/shlamin_e.html (accessed 
February 21, 2005). 
80 The Ministry was disbanded subsequently and Shlyamin now works in Finland.  
81 Ilkka Liikanen, “Euregio Karelia: A Model for Cross-Border Cooperation with Russia?,” Karelian 
Institute, University of Joensuu. http://www.iiss.org/rrpfreepdfs.php?scID=65 (accessed June 5, 2005). 
82 Henderson (fn. 40), 152.  
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municipal governments and NGOs of Nordic states, as well as from Northern Europe’s 
various inter-governmental organizations.83 Of the externally funded programs operating 
in 2003, for example, thirty were financed under the auspices of Interreg, Europe’s 
instrument for cross-border cooperation; eight by the Swedish region of Westerbotten; 
four by the Swedish Agency for International Development; twenty-four by the Nordic 
Council of Ministers; and eleven by the Barents Secretariat. In money terms, they ranged 
from a few hundred Euros to over half a million Euros. Funding included those for 
professorships in Norwegian language at Karelia State University, democracy training for 
the region’s young politicians, and the development of song and dance ensembles for 
indigenous peoples.84 
The regional elites’ strategies and openness to cooperation—or leadership 
factor—and the West’s developmental commitments were key to Karelia’s success in 
obtaining external funding. A third set of factors involves the broader society. During the 
Soviet period, there were social exchanges between Karelia and Finland, and Finnish was 
taught at the local university. Contacts with Finland and other Nordic neighbors 
intensified after communism’s collapse. As one local official put it, here no one 
“escapes” contact with Finland, but also other Nordic actors, with almost every Karelian 
having some interaction with Western neighbors as a grant beneficiary, tourist, exchange 
student, or businessman. Several high schools now teach Finnish and Swedish, and 
                                                 
83 It also has representative offices of the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Swedish-Karelian Business and 
Information Centre, and TACIS.  
84 http://www.gov.karelia.ru (accessed May 15, 2005). 
 47 
several university departments have the relevant language and history courses.85 These 
three factors—the West’s strong commitment to develop the frontier region; openness at 
the level of Karelian regional elite; and openness at the level of Karelian society—
account for the region’s record in attracting  aid and the peculiarity of its institutional 
development.   
Local government, which is used in Petrov’s study as one of the sub-indicators in 
calculations of regional democracy levels, provides a specific example of how Western 
involvement affected Karelia’s institutional development.  The EU regards 
democratically elected and socially responsive local government as an important 
institutional component of a democratic polity.  The significance that the EU attaches to 
local government is embodied in a special Charter, and in the various municipal 
development-related TACIS programs in Russia.   
A comparative study by Vladimir Gel’man and his collaborators, which sought to 
explain variations in local democracy among Russia’s regions in the first post-communist 
decade identified the “transboundary factor” as key to explaining Karelia’s local 
government development.  This factor was important in Karelia’s adoption in 1994, the 
first among Russian regions, of a democratic law on local government modeled on North 
European institutions.  EU funding also became an important resource affecting 
municipal politics in the region.  For example, in an effort to extend his power base in 
struggles against the regional governor, the mayor of the regional capital tapped into the 
many possibilities of attracting EU grants.  The mayor could be successful in obtaining 
                                                 
85 Author interview with Tatyana Klekachova, Executive Director, Swedish-Karelian Business and 
Information Center, Petrozavodsk, July 9, 2004. 
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grants in competition against other municipalities and regional bodies however only if he 
could demonstrate the democratic nature of his administration, and its social and 
economic performance.  Importantly, such key domestic actor as the federal government 
played only a marginal role in the process.  For example, when the mayor of a regional 
city tried to attract federal funding to strengthen his institutional power base, “the hope 
for help from the federal center was in vain, whereas Western sources turned out to be 
more effective.”  “Generally,” write Gel’man et al, “international factors continue to play 
a certain role in the maintenance of the political autonomy of the city.” Numerous 
training seminars, partnerships with Nordic municipalities and other contacts with EU 
donors over a decade ensured not only that the municipalities would seek to present a 
positive image of themselves to score points with the donors, but that certain norms 
actually became internalized in local government practices.  The importation of Western 
norms and practices has been evident in the practices of local government-NGO 
partnerships and contracting out of social services, consultations with NGOs, as well as 
public tendering of municipal services contracts.86  Most recently, in 2005, within the 
framework of a new federal law on local self-government Karelia opted for direct popular 
election of mayors in contrast to many other regions, which settled on appointment by 
                                                 
86 Vladimir Gel'man, Sergey Ryjhenkov, Yelena Belokurova, and Nadejhda Borisova, Avtonomiya ili 
kontrol'? Reforma mestnoy vlasi v gorodakh Rossii, 1991-2001 (Autonomy or control? Reform of local 
power in cities of Russia) (St. Petersburg: Letniy sad, 2002), 245, 230, 231. On civil society in Karelia, see 
Yelena Belokurova and Natalya Yargomskaya, “Do i posle Grajhdanskogo foruma: grajhdanskoe 
obschestvo v regionakh Severo-Zapada,” in Nikolay Petrov, ed., Grajhdanskoye obschchestvo i 
politicheskiye protsessy v regionakh, Working Paper, no. 3 (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2005). 
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local councils.  The latter system is perceived to be less democratic and, in the Russian 
political context, more easy to manipulate from above.87 
Pskov oblast is another Western frontier region with a population of 760,000, 
similar to that of Karelia. Until recently, it differed significantly from Karelia both in 
terms of openness of the regional elites, and Western commitment to it. In the 1990s, as 
neighboring Estonia and Latvia enjoyed rapid growth, democratic reform, and successful 
bids to EU membership, Pskov remained one of Russia’s least developed areas. 
Politically, Pskov has been a closed regime, electing a governor with a reformist agenda 
only at the end of 2004. In 1998, America’s then Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott likened Pskov to a “Jurassic-like theme park[s] of Soviet-era policies and 
personalities,” a stark contrast to what he called Russia’s regional “oases of 
liberalization.”88 Between 1996 and 2004, Pskov suffered from the incompetent rule of 
governor Vyacheslav Mikhailov, who suppressed political opposition and freedom of the 
press. Mikhailov, running on a “patriotic” ticket, in 1996 became Russia’s only governor 
affiliated with the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky. 
Mikhailov’s political affiliation and sympathies for the Russian ultra-nationalists did little 
to promote confidence building with the oblast’s Baltic neighbors. Instead, the Governor 
prioritized Pskov’s relations with the Belarus dictatorship. This contrasts with Karelia, 
which has been steadily orienting itself to Finland and the EU.89   
                                                 
87 Author interview with Andrey Patsinkovskiy, Head of Administration, Prionejhskiy rayon, Petrozavodsk, 
January 17, 2006. 
88 RFE/RL Newsline, November 9, 1998. 
89 Pskov also differed from its other neighbor Novgorod, since the mid-1990s a magnet for investors and 
donors. 
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Not only were Pskov regional elites closed to the West, but the latter also showed 
little willingness to engage the Pskov regime. One study thus described the sorry state of 
Pskov’s external relations: “Until the end of the 1990s, the Oblast was a blank spot on the 
map of projects funded by the EU TACIS Programme or by other international donors.”90  
At the same time, the isolated local NGOs that did apply for EU aid were unsuccessful 
because “back then Pskov was not the main concern” of the EU. Those who considered 
applying were discouraged to do so: “When we went to consult TACIS preliminarily, 
before applying, they said Pskov is not a priority . . . You are welcome to apply of course, 
but it is unlikely that your application will be considered favorably,” recalls a local NGO 
head.91 
The situation changed substantially around the time of accession of the Baltic 
states to the European Union in 2004 with Pskov becoming the EU’s Eastern border 
region. This new status ensured a sustained level of engagement on the part of European 
actors despite the continued closeness of the regime. TACIS staff on the ground 
maintained that it took a significant amount of “shaking up” of the regional officials by 
the EU in the form of awareness increasing seminars and meetings aimed at encouraging 
the oblast to open up to external cooperation. It was not too long before Pskov perceived 
the benefits of the newly proposed partnership with Europe. Similar to other EU border 
                                                 
90 Gulnara Roll, Tatiana Maximova, and Eero Mikenberg, “The External Relations of the Pskov Region of 
the Russian Federation,” Working Paper, no. 63 (Kiel: The Schleswig-Holstein Institute for Peace 
Research) http://www.schiff.uni-kiel.de/pdf_files/063.pdf  (accessed February 15, 2006). 
91 Author interview with Olga Vassilenko, Chairperson, NGO Chudskoe Project, Pskov, August 26, 2004. 
Another unsuccessful applicant in 1998 was Fund for Support of Civic Initiative. Author interview with 
Dmitriy Antoniuk, Pskov, August 26, 2004. 
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regions, as an incentive to project involvement it was given a voice in the selection of 
Western partners and proposals related to cross-border cooperation. Financial and 
economic benefits of neighbor-friendliness were also not lost on Pskov, as indeed on 
EU’s new Baltic members. One regional official illustrated the importance of EU funding 
in encouraging cross-border cooperation: “The Balts now feel that they have to work with 
us. They are about to get money from EU structural funds. We say to them we are very 
happy for you, but the situation has to change so that not only you will get all the 
money.”92 In 2004, Pskov was already engaged in several EU-supported projects with 
Estonia and in negotiating future neighborhood programs.  The development of a Pskov-
Livonia Euroregion was also under way aimed at promoting cooperation between 
authorities in Pskov and the Baltic countries and hailed as a “model for good neighbor 
relations with the EU.”93   
Moreover, while in the past, project cooperation was largely at the level of the 
Pskov regional administration, TACIS staff point out that it has now also moved to the 
lower, municipal levels of authority. Likewise, previously suspicious of local NGOs 
engaging in unsanctioned foreign cooperation projects, regional officials now perceive 
that “if local organizations, including independent ones, do not participate, Pskov will fall 
out [of the process] and will lose financially.”94  The regional authorities even turned to 
local NGOs for cooperation in running Western funded projects because they themselves 
                                                 
92 Author interview with Andrey Balandin, Consultant, Committee for Foreign Affairs, Pskov Region 
Administration, August 26, 2004. 
93 http://www.pskov.ru/en/economics/external_constraint (accessed February 15, 2006). 
94 Author interview with Valentina Chaplinskaya, EC delegation in St. Petersburg, July 13, 2004. 
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lacked such project implementation training and experience.95  The change in perceptions 
is similar to what we observed in Karelia, where regional elites came to regard external 
funding as an important economic and political resource and thought it in their best 
interest to internalize the norms and practices of European donors.   
The availability and structure of EU funding therefore encouraged greater 
regional openness and interaction with external actors at the level of administrative elites, 
organized social groups, and broader society. In this case, Pskov’s location on the EU 
border was key to the EU’s decision to “shake up” the region.  The data make clear that 
no such “shaking up” has taken place in other regions badly in need of democracy, such 
as the closed republics. While high levels of openness encouraged Western presence in 
other, non-frontier regions, in Pskov’s case location on the EU border ensured a 
commitment to regional reform even in the initial absence of intra-regional openness.   
The emergence of the EU’s shared borders with Pskov also contributed to greater 
levels of economic cooperation with the Baltic neighbors.  Compared to 2003, in 2004, 
trade with Estonia grew by 229 percent, and with Latvia, by 27 percent.  In the first nine 
months of the year 2004 alone, i.e., immediately prior to, and after accession of the Baltic 
states to the EU, there has been a threefold increase in foreign investment into the oblast 
compared to the corresponding period in the previous year.96   
Pskov’s governor Mikhail Kuznetsov maintains that economic processes 
accompanying EU expansion eastwards will only serve to further encourage cross-border 
                                                 
95 Belokurova and Yargomskaya (fn. 86) 27. 
96 http://invest.pskov.ru/i_prac.php?action=show&id=107&lang=en  (accessed February 15, 2006).  See 
also “Baltiyskoe napravlenie: god spustya posle vstupleniya Estonii i Latvii v YeEs,” 27 April 2005, 
http://pln-pskov.ru/arhiv/pragmatika/22290.html (accessed September 20, 2006). 
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economic activity and greater contacts among neighbors: “Having entered the European 
Union, they [the Baltic states] are already suffering the economic impact of accession.  
Because of the increase in labor costs, many industries are becoming ineffective, and they 
have to be moved somewhere. . . If they move them here, it will be good both for us and 
for them.  They will save.  And we will have created new jobs.”97  
Possibilities for business and project cooperation have in turn encouraged the 
oblast to replicate the more transparent practices of the European neighbors.  “We are 
interested in contacts with European countries,” maintained the governor when asked 
about the reason for his frequent meetings with officials from Europe. “This is why the 
creation of an image of a civilized oblast with working laws is my key goal.”98   
The changes in Pskov’s developmental trajectory shortly before and after EU 
borders shifted and it became the focus of EU involvement are reflected in the latest 
regional democracy scores.  Astonishingly, aside from another Northwestern region, 
Komi, Pskov shows the highest growth in democracy, which is reflected in the difference 
between the composite scores of twenty-seven for 1991-2001, and thirty-four in the 
moving average scores for 2000-2004.  While most of the regions do not show significant 
                                                 
97  “Interv’yu s gubernatorom,” Official website of the Pskov oblast’ administration, November 1, 2005, 
http://www.pskov.ru/ru/interview/governor/26 (accessed September 20, 2006). These economic processes 
are linked to broader patterns of economic interaction in the region influenced by EU expansion, such as a 
surge in Finnish investments into Estonia in the 1990s, and competition and labor costs eventually leading 
Estonian businesses to invest into Pskov.   
98 Ibid.  
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differences between the earlier and later scores, and some have even slid down on the 
scale, Pskov shows an eight-point jump.99   
Karelia and Pskov illustrate how current developments conditioned by a region’s 
geographic location, affect its democratic trajectory.  The focus on current patterns of 
exposure to the West does not suggest that we dismiss the role of longer-term regional 
historical legacies.  For example, Pskov, at one time a closed fortress region and buffer 
against external invaders, also has a history of being ruled by Novgorod, known as the 
“cradle of Russian democracy” involved in Hanseatic trade.  And in the case of Karelia, 
its Finnish legacy may have had an impact on the adaptability to democratic norms 
among both its elites and broader public, while its place in Finnish national mythology is 
an important factor in Finland’s current interest in getting involved in aid projects in 
Karelia.    
The impact of these longer-term historical developments on current patterns of 
regional democratization however only serve to confirm our argument, but over a much 
more extended historical timeframe.  This is because the “legacies” inferred to explain 
greater levels of democracy, as is the case with Novgorod’s involvement in Hanseatic 
trade, or Karelia’s ties to Finland, are often linked to exposure to West European 
civilization.  Geography, and the patterns of social, economic, and political interaction 
that it conditions depending on the wider political context at a given point in time, matter, 
whether we are looking at longer-term historical legacies, or current developments.  As 
                                                 
99 Krasnoyarsk also has an eight-point increase in the democracy score. 
http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml (accessed September 20, 2006). 
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Kopstein and Reilly rightly discern, while “path dependence of political and economic 
reforms may explain the process of change, . . ., location determines the path.”100      
 
Conclusions 
 
The geographic incremental processes of democratization in Russia’s frontier 
regions and regional patterns of EU aid suggest that sub-national geography should be 
considered an important factor in our analysis of post-communist democratic change. 
Geographic proximity to the West facilitates the diffusion of Western influences in 
Russia’s localities increasing their openness. Proximity also encourages neighboring 
Western actors to pursue targeted democratization efforts.  
Not only frontier regions are objects of targeted EU aid however.  In fact, 
territorially more remote non-frontier regions, extending as far as Western Siberia, are 
also likely to be beneficiaries of aid if they are open to external influences.  These 
findings are consistent with the EU’s declared objective of “rewarding good achievers” 
and show how not only states with membership prospects in the Union are subject to 
sustained aid efforts.101  
Significantly, few of the highest democratic achievers are located too far East or 
South, a pattern which confirms that diffusion processes leading to greater openness and 
democracy are influenced by a region’s geographic location.  The EU is also prepared to 
go this far East or South in its targeted aid activity in the regions.  For better or worse, the 
                                                 
100 (fn. 1), 24. 
101 Vachudová (fn. 45); Kopstein and Reilly (fn. 1). 
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regions on Russia’s Southern and Eastern frontiers are likely to be influenced by other 
external players. 
A detailed discussion of these influences is beyond the scope of this study.  We 
briefly note here the lack of established democracies bordering on Russia’s Southern 
regions.  China, an economic mega-player in the Russian Far East, is not a democracy.  
Japan, an important neighboring democracy, maintains a largely economic involvement 
in the Far East, which is distinct from the “normative power” democratizing concerns of 
the EU in Russia’s regions.  Although Japan is among the leading foreign aid donors, 
scholars have also discerned the business-driven nature of its aid policies.102   
The regional dimension of aid activity of other major “non-neighbor” donors is 
likewise beyond the scope of this study.  American democracy promoters in Russia’s 
regions have tended to support local actors that are institutionally relatively more 
developed, and perceived to be more “Western” in terms of their business practices, 
language skills, and issue orientation.  Donors like the US and Canada also included a 
“Northern” gradient in their Russian aid policies, thus partly overlapping with that of the 
EU.103    
                                                 
102 Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor (fn. 71). 
103 Admittedly, not every Western aid project achieves its intended goals.  Thomas Carothers, Aiding 
Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1999); Janine Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Sarah L. Henderson, “Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Non-
Governmental Organization Sector in Russia,” Comparative Political Studies 35 (March 2002); Mendelson 
and Glenn (fn. 3); Marcia A. Weigle, Russia’s Liberal Project: State-Society Relations in the Transition 
from Communism (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1999).  
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Such targeted and sustained efforts of Western actors, who chose to partner with 
more open and more geographically, culturally, and institutionally “Western” regions, 
will only serve to reinforce the already existing spatial disparities in levels of democracy.  
In regions bordering a powerful democratic player, the latter may over time decisively 
influence their democratization trajectory.  The causal processes discussed in this article 
are therefore not unidirectional and the argument should not be interpreted as a 
suggestion that Western aid is the decisive factor influencing regional democracy levels 
across all regions.  What we observe are “clusters of interaction” of regional openness, 
democracy, and targeted EU aid, which are in turn related to a region’s geographic 
location.  
Finally, we acknowledge that the focus on the regional level and external actors 
need not obscure the importance of the national government as a trend-setter for the 
nation-wide democracy trajectory.  Nevertheless, the continued Russian regional 
engagement with the West militates against whole-nation bias in our analysis of political 
change. President Putin might see external donors as agents plotting another Color 
Revolution.  The mayor of Pskov or Petrozavodsk by contrast, might see them as partners 
genuinely interested in addressing problems of concern to their common neighborhood.  
Likewise, the NGOs’ mobilization against some of the more draconian efforts to control 
Western funding illustrates the limited financial reach of the federal government, which 
is not eager to substitute for external resources crucial to the survival and by extension, 
vital social activities, of many a local NGO.104  The Governor of a border region might be 
a Kremlin appointee, and yet his interlocutors in regional developmental or investment 
                                                 
104 The reference is to a federal law regulating funding to NGOs, adopted in December 2005. 
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projects are equally, if not more, likely to be neighborhood actors, and not the figures in 
the Kremlin.  Finally, security rhetoric notwithstanding, Moscow has been rather 
reluctant to fund Russia-EU border security checkpoints, leaving this business to regional 
governments and their Western neighbors.105     
Russia may be a “torn” nation as Samuel Huntington suggests, but not just in the 
sense of its different national leaders wanting to shift the civilizational belonging and 
identity of its people, but also in geographic terms and spatial value patterns.106 A 
geographic incremental process of Einbindung107 is evidently taking place tying the 
Western and outward-looking localities into a web of interactions, and perhaps eventually 
greater integration, with Western neighbors. These geographically conditioned processes 
should help us explain and predict change throughout the post-communist world and in 
other settings. 
 
Appendix 1 
 
1 (a) Procedures for Calculating the Openness Score 
 
 
In order to create an aggregate score for each of the different openness scores, we first 
ranked all the values for each sub-indicator. We then sorted them in ascending order and 
arranged them into ten groups with each group being assigned a score from the smallest 
                                                 
105 This issue has been a subject of conflict between Karelian government and federal agencies.   
106 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1996), 139.  
107 Mouritzen (fn. 66), 306. 
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value of 1 to the highest of 10. This procedure ensures that the assigned scores are evenly 
distributed.  The total score is the sum of all sub-indicators that comprise each of the 
respective “oscores.”  The score’s range from 1 to 10 is in accordance with the ascending 
values for each sub-indicator. Therefore, the composite openness score “oscore95-03” 
ranges from 3 to 30; and the openness scores “oscore98-02” and “oscore99-03” include 
five sub-indicators and range from 5 to 50.  The “oscore99-02” includes six sub-
indicators and ranges from 6 to 60.   
The openness score for the years 1995-2003 was composed of three sub-
indicators: Newspaper circulation per 1000 people, number of telephones per 1000 
people and foreign investment per capita.   The score for 1998-2002 includes the above 
three sub-indicators plus exports to Non-CIS countries per capita in millions of USD, and 
per capita number of outgoing international and domestic telephone calls.  The 1999-
2003 openness score is similar to the 1998-2002 score except that it does not have the 
domestic and international calls sub-indicator (because the latest Goskomstat data for this 
is 2002), but has an additional “modern” indicator of cell phones per capita.  The 1999-
2002 score is composed of the most complete set of sub-indicators. 
 
 
1 (b) Reliability Test for Openness Scores 
 
In order to test for the reliability of the openness scores, including “oscore95-03,” 
“oscore98-02,” “oscore99-02,” and “oscore99-03,” we conducted a Cronbach’s Alpha 
test.  The test shows the correlation between each sub-indicator and total score.  Since all 
of the sub-scores for each sub-indicator are measured on the same scale from 1 to 10, we 
can use the un-standardized items for the test. For the openness score “oscore95-03,” the 
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scale reliability coefficient is 0.6761, which is slightly below the satisfactory alpha value 
of 0.7 and indicates a somewhat low correlation. The most reliable openness score is 
“oscore99-02,” which includes all the six sub-indicators, with the highest alpha value of 
0.7877. However, due to limited data availability and intention to reflect the time trend 
by lagging the openness variable, only “oscore95-03” can attain the greater data points 
objective. Considering high correlation between all the openness scores, as presented in 
the correlation matrix in Appendix 1 (e), we conclude that it is reliable to use the 
“oscore95-03” as the measure of openness.  The results of the tests are presented in 
Tables 1-4.   
Table 1 
Cronbach’s Alpha test for “oscore95-03” 
Test scale = mean (unstandardized items) 
Item Obs Sign Item-test 
Correlation 
Item-rest 
Correlation 
Average inter-
item 
covariance 
Alpha 
Newspaper 
circulation per 
1000 people 
791 + 0.7003 0.3629 5.264394 0.7359 
 
Foreign investment 
per capita  
791 + 0.8258 0.5596 2.726261 0.4829 
Telephones per 
1000 population  
791 + 0.8099 0.5576 2.99827 0.4926 
Test Scale                                                                                         3.662975             0.6761 
 
Table 2 
Cronbach’s Alpha test for “oscore98-02” 
Test scale = mean (unstandardized items) 
Item Obs Sign Item-test 
Correlation 
Item-rest 
Correlation 
Average inter-
item 
covariance 
Alpha 
Newspaper 
circulation per 
1000 people 
792 + 0.6518 0.3862 3.485634 0.7189 
Telephones per 
1000 population  
791 + 0.7553 0.5443 2.899018 0.6548 
Foreign investment 
per capita  
792 + 0.8125 0.6226 2.305879 0.5928 
Exports to non-CIS 
countries per 
capita 
616 + 0.6779 0.4491 3.206059 0.6951 
Number of 
outgoing 
international and 
406 + 0.6406 0.3936 3.440599 0.7138 
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local telephone 
calls per capita 
Test Scale                                                                                       3.091075              0.7276 
 
Table 3 
Cronbach’s Alpha test for “oscore99-02” 
Test scale = mean (unstandardized items) 
Item Obs Sign Item-test 
Correlation 
Item-rest 
Correlation 
Average inter-
item 
covariance 
Alpha 
Newspaper 
circulation per 
1000 people 
792 + 0.6632 0.4266 3.734076 0.7786 
Telephones per 
1000 population  
791 + 0.7443 0.5495 3.378774 0.7468 
Foreign investment 
per capita  
792 + 0.8009 0.6246 2.883544 0.7094 
Exports to non-CIS 
countries per 
capita 
616 + 0.6605 0.4633 3.618893 0.7726 
Number of 
outgoing 
international and 
local telephone 
calls per capita 
406 + 0.6168 0.3992 3.822574 0.7852 
Number of cell 
phones per capita  
438 + 0.8147 0.6978 3.091075 0.7276 
Test Scale                                                                                         3.427454              0.7877 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Cronbach’s Alpha test for “oscore99-03” 
Test scale = mean (unstandardized items) 
Item Obs Sign Item-test 
Correlation 
Item-rest 
Correlation 
Average inter-
item 
covariance 
Alpha 
Newspaper 
circulation per 
1000 people 
792 + 0.6722 0.4196 4.374589 0.7853 
Telephones per 
1000 population  
791 + 0.7546 0.5484 3.851814 0.7411 
Foreign investment 
per capita  
792 + 0.8001 0.6066 3.355847 0.7089 
Exports to non-CIS 
countries per 
capita 
616 + 0.6813 0.4672 4.156221 0.7729 
Number of cell 
phones per capita  
438 + 0.8240 0.6937 3.440599 0.7138 
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Test Scale                                                                                       3.822574              0.7852 
 
 
 
1 (c) Summary Statistics 
The summary of independent and dependent variables is based on the panel format 
dataset with seventy-nine regions used in the regression analysis, as well as the dataset 
that includes eighty-eight regions, which was used in bivariate correlations analysis.  
Since for each variable, the data availability varies in the time range, the number in 
“count” is different for each of the summaries. 
Summary 
Statistics 
Democracy 
1991-2001 
Unit: index 
Democracy  
1999-2004 
Unit: index 
Distance 
Unit: 
kilometers 
  
 
Cumulative 
aid per 
capita  
1992-2005 
Unit: Euros 
Aid per 
capita  
moving 
averages, 
1992-2001 
Unit: Euros 
Urbanizatio
n 1995-2003 
(share of 
urban 
population) 
Unit: 
percent 
Openness 
score 95-
03 
Unit: index 
 
Openness 
score 99-
03 
Unit: 
index 
 
 
Openness 
score 98-02 
Unit: index 
 
Openness 
score 99-02 
Unit: index 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
27.511363 
 
28.87342 
 
2366.684 2.94193 
 
0.27838 69.23164 
 
16.173 
 
28.40455 
 
26.59545 
 
31.66193 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
6.19972 
 
6.26865 
 
1817.21774 8.65422 
 
0.80158 12.59192 
 
6.67196 
 
11.178 
 
10.27015 
 
12.17123 
 
Minimum 
 
14 
 
16 
 
315 0 
 
0 26.6 
 
3 
 
5 
 
5 
 
6 
 
Maximum 
 
45 
 
46 
 
7155 55.36 
 
6.46931 100 
 
30 
 
50 
 
50 
 
60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 (d) Result of OLS Regression 
    
Impact of Aid and Geographic Location on Regional Democracy over Time:  
Results with Two-Year Lags using Aid Moving Averages* 
 
Variable         Coefficient              t Sig. 
Distance from Helsinki -.0352611              -1.86    0.065     
Muslim region  -.2442816     -5.22     0.000 
Urbanization .221056     2.83      0.005     
Aid moving average .1097767    2.97      0.004      
Openness  .1022367     2.94      0.004      
Constant 2.414364       6.98    0.000 
N                      158                     
  
Impact of Aid and Geographic Location on Regional Democracy over Time:  
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Results with Two-Year Lags using Cumulative Aid Per Capita* 
 
Variable         Coefficient              t Sig. 
Distance from Helsinki -.0445276              -2.34    0.020     
Muslim region  -.2428085     -5.08     0.000 
Urbanization .2652348    3.41      0.001     
Cumulative aid .0035081    1.55      0.122      
Openness     .1024793    2.87      0.005      
Constant 2.302931       6.58    0.000 
N                      158                     
 * All values, except for the Muslim dummy have been logged. 
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1 (e) Bivariate Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Correlations 
 
Distance from 
Helsinki in KM 
Muslim 
region 
Democracy, 
1991-2001 
Democracy, 
1999-2003 
Democracy, 
2000-2004 
Aid per 
capita 
Openness 
95-03 
(2003) 
Openness 
98-02 
(2002) 
Openness 
99-02 
(2002) 
Openness 
99-03 
(2002) 
Urbanizati
on, 
 2003 
Distance from 
Helsinki in KM 1.000           
 .           
Muslim region -.068 1.000          
 .530 .          
Democracy, 
1991-2001 
 
-.270* -.436** 1.000         
 .011 .000 .         
Democracy, 
1999-2003 
 
-.281** -.459** .916** 1.000        
 .008 .000 .000 .        
Democracy, 
2000-2004 
 
-.280** -.435** .904** .992** 1.000       
 .008 .000 .000 .000 .       
Aid per capita -.227* -.113 .433** .389** .397** 1.000      
 .034 .294 .000 .000 .000 .      
Openness 95-03 
(2003) 
 
-.392** -.270* .563** .582** .583** .188 1.000     
 .000 .011 .000 .000 .000 .080 .     
Openness 98-02 
(2002) 
 
-.393** -.196 .621** .638** .638** .260* .872** 1.000    
 .000 .067 .000 .000 .000 .014 .000 .    
Openness 99-02 
(2002) 
 
-.408** -.203 .628** .637** .637** .268* .883** .990** 1.000   
 .000 .058 .000 .000 .000 .012 .000 .000    
Openness 99-03 
(2002) 
 
-.373** -.222* .629** .636** .634** .273** .876** .979** .983** 1.000  
 .000 .037 .000 .000 .000 .010 .000 .000 .000 .  
Urbanization 
2003 
 
-.116 -.311** .550** .555** .540** .234* .706** .642** .649** .641** 1.000 
 .281 .003 .000 .000 .000 .028 .000 .000 .000 .000 . 
Note: 
1) *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
    **  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
2) The first line for each sub indicator shows the Pearson Correlation, and second line shows Sig. (2-tailed). 
3) Aid figure used is sum of all aid per capita for the years 1992-2005. 
4) For the openness scores and urbanization data for later years were used as an illustration of latest correlation patterns. 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Petrov’s Democracy Scores 
 
 
The democracy scores for 1991-2001, 1999-2003 and 2000-2004 are based on the 
following criteria: (1) openness of political life, meaning transparency and levels of 
public involvement in political life; (2) level of democracy in federal, regional, and local 
elections, assessed by looking at whether there exist free and fair elections for posts at all 
levels, their competitiveness, the use of the so-called administrative resources, including 
interference by authorities or courts in electoral processes, other limitations on political 
rights; (3) level of political pluralism, assessed by looking at whether there exist stable 
parties, factions in legislative assembly, electoral and post-electoral coalitions; (4) media 
freedom and independence; (6) civil society, as measured by existence and numbers of 
NGOs, referenda, public activity of different kinds, demonstrations, pickets, protests not 
sanctioned by authorities; (7) nature of regional political regime, assessed by looking at 
balance of power, number of elected versus appointed officials, independence of 
judiciary and law enforcement agencies, and extent of citizens’ rights; (8) quality and 
turnover of political elites, assessed by looking at electoral change of leaders that does 
not involve the “dismantling of the whole system,” diversity of elites and “vitality of 
mechanisms for compromises between competing interests”; (9) corruption, assessed by 
examining  the degree of the merging of political and economic elites and record of 
corruption scandals; and (10) local self-government as measured by existence of elected 
local bodies and their level of activity and influence.  A five point scale was used to 
assess each region in each of the ten categories, with “the higher the number, the more 
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democracy.”  The overall rating is calculated by adding up individual ratings in each of 
the ten categories, with the highest possible score fifty, and the lowest being ten. In order 
to test the accuracy of expert evaluation indexes, which, as is usually the case with such 
analysis, include a measure of subjectivism, Petrov also conducted an analysis of 
electoral statistics for the period from 1999 to 2002.  Democracy was assessed by looking 
at electoral turnout; competitiveness of the race; voter negativism; and electoral law 
violations.  He found a relatively high level of correlation, at .61, between the results of 
the two different evaluations, although there were also variations in how individual 
regions ranked. 
The Petrov moving average scores were calculated as follows.  Because of 
possible large fluctuations in data for sub-indicators related to such aspects of democratic 
process as change of governor and voting in regional level elections, which had been held 
at different times in each region, year by year indicators would not be an accurate change 
in democracy trends across all regions. Therefore, in order to perceive the general 
democracy trend, two “simple” moving average scores were calculated for the time 
period of 5 years: 1999-2003 and 2000-2004.  The simple moving average procedure 
assigns equal weight to each data point.  The SMA is calculated by adding the values of 
an indicator for several time periods and then dividing this sum by the number of time 
periods. The formula is: 
 
(p stands for the value of each time period measured, and n represents the length 
of moving average.) 
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In this case of democracy score, the length of moving average is 5 years (n=5). The 
calculation was done as follows: 
 
 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
 
Democracy score 1999-2003 = (demo99+demo00+demo01+demo02+demo03)/5 
Democracy score 2000-2004 = (demo00+demo01+demo02+demo03+demo04)/5 
 
 
Appendix 3 
 
3 (a) Democracy Promotion Component of EU Aid 
 
Although “democracy, market economy, and rule of law” are key declared objectives of 
Tacis, it covers projects, which could range anything from healthcare reform to building 
security checkpoints, to NGO development.  This makes it difficult to distinguish what 
exact share of overall Tacis project aid went for activities, which could be more directly 
linked with democracy promotion.   
Such large and costly infrastructure and policy projects as healthcare, tax, and 
pension reform, or building security checkpoints usually involve federal agencies, and are 
distinct from the regional component of aid, which is the subject of this paper.  Projects 
listed under the regional cooperation rubric mostly involve such non-state actors as 
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NGOs or universities, or regional and local authorities.  In setting up the EU local support 
offices, from which we draw our project data, the EU specifically lists “an emphasis on 
local civil society institutions” and civil society development among its key objectives 
(http://www.eucoop.ru/en/objectives.asp).   
Examples of typical projects going through the local support offices would be 
university training or exchange programs, grants to local NGOs, city twinning initiatives, 
training for regional and municipal officials or businesses.  The EU makes a strong link 
in these projects with democracy objectives.  See 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/tacis/regional_en.htm .   
A further indication of the share of regional projects related to democratic 
institution-building objectives is the distribution of project beneficiaries.  Out of the total 
of 1147 projects in the dataset, federal actors were key beneficiaries in only 12.1 percent 
of all projects.  At the same time, regional bodies in 21.4, local governments, in 10.8, 
universities in 24.7, NGOs in 16, private business in 11.9 percent.  All in all, non-state 
actors were beneficiaries of project aid in approximately 60 percent of all regional project 
activity.   
Tacis is usually distinguished from the European Initiative for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR), which had been set up in 1994 and covers various countries not 
limited to the post-communist region.  The regional projects in the LSO dataset that we 
use also include projects conducted within the framework of EIDHR in the regions.  In 
terms of support for civil society, EIDHR overlaps with the objectives of Tacis projects, 
but differs in its focus on human rights issues, such as police brutality, racial or ethnic 
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inequality, or citizens’ access to the European Court of Human Rights.  See 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/eidhr/projects_reports_en.htm#europe 
The EU instruments for supporting democratic and market institutions are usually 
distinguished from such other developmental goals as poverty reduction.  See 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ consultations/cswp_tacis.htm .  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/consultations/cswp_tacis.htm.   
Another key area of assistance, with a substantial volume of funding estimated to 
be 1 billion Euros since 1992 to the NIS, is nuclear safety.  Implementation partners are 
federal agencies or ministries, and as such, the projects covered by this program are 
beyond the scope of this article focusing on regional aid.  
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/nuclear_safety/intro/index.htm .  
 
 
3 (b) Top Ten EU Project Participant Countries 
Country Total number of 
projects in which 
country served as 
main, or one of key 
partners 
Germany 203 
Finland 181 
United Kingdom 159 
France 141 
Netherlands 70 
Italy 68 
Belgium 51 
Sweden 45 
Denmark 46 
Greece 20 
 
